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Social Issues of Genome Innovation and
Intellectual Property
Elaine Alma Draper*'

Introduction
As a result of the $3 billion Human Genome Project to map the
human genetic structure, scientists and physicians will be able to target
1
more and more genetic predispositions and diseases in individuals.
Much money is going into developing genetic technologies. But what
are the implications of the use of these technologies?
In the many cases in which these genetic technologies have profit
potential, patents and the patent system are a useful way of recovering
the costs of developing them. 2 The important issues in genome
research go beyond patent law to the social and ethical issues involved
in new genetic technologies. Attending to social issues can best be done
as technologies are developed and patented - not just after the fact.
As a way of looking at the social issues of genome innovation and
intellectual property, I will focus on applications of genetics ,in the
workplace and the special role of employers in handling genetic
information. We can learn a great deal from the workplace about the
social context of the new genetics and its significance. We will consider
the ways in which screening technologies and policies have been applied
and associated information-control issues. Intellectual property involves
information control and use. As we get more genetic information: Who
will own and control it; who will use it and for what purposes?
I will focus on five sets of social issues regarding genome
information and innovation: First, the problem of information access
*

Dr. Draper is a Visiting Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley where

she received her Ph.D. Her book, Risky Business, infra note 5, received wide acclaim.
1 See The Code of Codes (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood, eds. 1992).
2 See Thomas G. Field, Jr., Intellectual Property: Some Practical and Legal
Fundamentals,35 Idea 79 (1994) and Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Origins of the
Human Genome Project, 5 Risk 97 (1994). [A current version of Field's paper is on
the Internet at http:www.fplc.edu/tfield/plfip.htm.]
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and privacy, with particular attention to the large data banks and search
companies that raise important questions about control of information.
Second, the issue of exclusionary practices affecting individuals
perceived to be at special risk and the impact of social stratification by
race and ethnicity, gender, and social class on genetic information.
Third, the pitfalls of screening for susceptibility as opposed to
monitoring for environmefital hazards. Fourth, drug screening
information as a model to avoid for the use of screening technologies.
And fifth, implications of fetal exclusion policies as precedent for the
applications of genetic information, especially the ways in which
employers require individuals and their private doctors to assume
responsibility for risk. Finally, I will consider some ideas about how
genome innovation could be managed more rationally and fairly, with
attention to ownership rights, confidentiality, and equity.
Information Control and Data Banks
Genetic information can be used to screen workers. People with
genes perceived to be defective typically do not own the information
about those genes. Genetic risks raise questions of control over
information and privacy, because genetic information in the workplace
is unlikely to be kept confidential between patients and physicians.
Doctor-patient confidentiality tends to be far weaker than in private
medical practice. 3 Managers and safety officers pressure in-house
physicians and nurses for information on individual workers. Physicians
give many examples of this. Some doctors complain that at times they
are inundated with requests for medical information from managers
who want to know detailed medical information and test results, not
4
only the fitness of the person to do the work.
3 See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 29 Houston L.Rev. 23 (1992); L. N. Geller et al.,
Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of Genetic Discrimination: A Case
Study Analysis, 2 Sd. & Eng. Ethics 71 (1996); and NIH-DOE Working Group on
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Human Genome Research, Genetic
Information and Health Insurance (NIH 1993).
4 As part of the research I did for a forthcoming book on doctors employed by
corporations and conflicting loyalties in occupational medicine, I interviewed
company physicians and others knowledgeable about occupational medicine across the
U.S. Here I refer to aonfidential interviews with informants who requested
anonymity.
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In employment, we usually focus on confidentiality of the results
from tests that employers conduct. Even when employers do not test
workers themselves, they can use medical information in making
5
decisions regarding hiring, firing, transferring or insuring people.
Employees and applicants describe pre-existing medical conditions on
questionnaires and identify genetic characteristics that may make them
predisposed to disease or make them high-risk around workplace
exposures. Such information helps alert management to potential health
problems and may shield them from liability and medical costs for
employees' disease.
Employers increasingly turn to outside contractors to provide
medical services. These firms are under contract to conduct specific
tests and provide screening data. Major breaches of confidential
medical records occur. Contractors are subject to competitive pressure
to keep the employer's business. If they refuse to submit records,
another contractor will provide what the employer demands. Many
contractors send the entire employee medical record to management.
Small clinics that contract to provide health services to a company do
not always know the regulations regarding medical records or
understand confidentiality. Rather, they often assume that since the
company pays for the medical information, they are entitled to all of it,
rather than just aggregate data or a determination that an employee is
fit to work. A physician who has worked as an in-house company
doctor and under contract to companies says:
Confidentiality of medical records is very much of a
problem. For example, companies that do periodic
examinations and surveillance exams are obliged to send
detailed medical reports to the personnel director. You
know it's wrong, but if you don't do it, you don't get the
contract, and so that puts the burden on the integrity of the
vendor. Some of them do; some of them don't.
It is common for employers to look at individuals' past medical
information, including their past Workers' Compensation claims. The
issue of confidentiality of records is intensified now by the ability to
5 See NIH-DOE supra note 3; Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, State
Legislative Efforts to Regulate Use and PotentialMisuse of Genetic Information, 51
Am. J. Hum. Genetics 637 (1992); Elaine Draper, Risky Business: Genetic Testing
and Exclusionary Practices in the Hazardous Workplace (1991); and F. Allan Hanson,
Testing Testing- Social Consequences of the Examined Life (1993).
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accumulate records electronically and the inability to protect them
effectively. Data banks and search companies pose special problems
related to: Who owns genetic information? In many cases, search
companies provide employers with health risk information about
employees that is even more valuable than the company's own
questionnaires and in-house screening program. That is, while the focus
of concern about genetic data usually has been on employers' own
screening tests, company testing is in fact an issue of minor importance
compared with the flood of information coming from search
companies, data banks, and credit reporting agencies. The potential
adverse social consequences of employer testing are also minimal
compared with the abuses of search companies and computer data
banks available to employers, which are largely out of individual
medical professionals' control.
Increasingly sophisticated data banks for health information
exacerbate problems of privacy and inappropriate procedures for
granting access to records. For example, employers and insurers can
obtain employee medical information from data bases such as the
national Medical Information Bureau (MIB) and the genetic data banks
operated by biotechnology companies or the DNA forensic banks of
state governments. 6 They may use this information for employmentrelated reasons that go beyond insurance underwriting. Such disclosures
of medical information may have serious repercussions that become
increasingly important as medical data continue to proliferate.
The MIB has medical records of about fifteen million people in the
U.S. Part of the MIB data contains information about genetic and
family diseases. When people apply for insurance, they sign a waiver
authorizing the MIB to have the data and permitting the insurance
company to obtain whatever records the MIB has. Insurance companies
can get the data from the MIB whenever a person applies for insurance
if they are among the large number that belongs to it. However, the
MIB incorporates a huge amount of inaccurate data, which can lead to
discrimination against a person in terms of getting life insurance, health
6 See Advances in Genetic Information: A Guide for State Policy Makers, (R.
Steven Brown & Karen Marshall, eds. 2d Ed. 1993); Philip Reilly, DNA Banking, 51
Am. J. Hum. Genetics 1169 (1992); and Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a
Consequence of Genetic Testing, 50 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 476 (1992).
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insurance, and employment. Serious injustices are done because the
7
information in data banks and credit companies is incorrect.
Employers can hire a computer-search company to investigate a
pool of prospective employees and get a great deal of information
about them. It could be very cost-effective if the employer can avoid
having two or three very expensive employees by screening them out
when they apply for a job. Credit-reporting agencies like Equifax and
TRW can do low-cost searches on potential employees that give
companies valuable information about a person's health risks, prior
exposure to health hazards, employment, and medical history, along
with information regarding felony reports and legal records, driving
records, insurance history, drug-treatment reports, and use of
medications. These background checks often mix personal, medical,
and financial information, some of which may help predict future
medical costs. A physician who has provided medical services to many
companies received a call from a major search company asking for
personal and medical information on a recent graduate of an
occupational medical residency training program in which the physician
taught. He said:
She started asking me over the phone "Have you ever been
to dinner with him? Does he drink much? Does he talk
about the Communist Party?" And then she got into more
and more personal and medical stuff. They're one of the
three largest credit-reporting agencies in the country, and
it's the most incredible invasion of privacy you've ever
imagined. For less than twenty dollars, they'll give you a
person's last ten years of major medical and Workers'
Compensation charges, and from RVS codes essentially tell
you what diseases they have. They'll do sub rosa
investigations to find out about alcoholism, drugs, troubled
teenagers, bad marriages - the laundry list just goes on and
on; you just figure out how much you want to spend.
The search companies' promotional material portrays their
background checks as useful to employers evaluating potential costs
that an employee might represent. Company personnel offices are
besieged with sales information from search companies. The sales pitch
is that the corporate doctor conducting preplacement exams, even
including a drug test of the urine, does not begin to offer the company
7

See Geller et al., sujra note 3 and NIH-DOE, supra note 3.
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the potential cost savings that the search company does, and they can
do it without the person knowing it takes place. Search companies then
appear to be a bargain.
Social values and government rules regarding medical
confidentiality are very much in flux. The laws governing patient-client
confidentiality are murky in many instances, particularly concerning
occupational medicine and employer medical programs. The extent to
which medical information must be kept private - and not revealed to
employers, insurers or others - is currently being redefined. Search
companies describe their activities as credit reporting, which is
protected under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Although legal
restrictions have an effect on search companies, these companies are still
in business and doing well.
Even when employers are reluctant to use genetic information to
exclude workers, insurance companies may pressure companies to
collect genetic information and to differentiate between high-risk and
low-risk individuals. Insurance companies have a long history of
screening, charging differential rates according to risk, denying service
to high-risk individuals, and failing to respect medical confidentiality.
In some cases, the insurer is the employer. Employers say they have
lost a sizable part of their profitability to health-care costs in the last ten
years. Self-insured companies can save on medical costs and avoid the
state laws and regulations that are designed to ensure adequate health
insurance for employees. 8 They have access to vast amounts of
information about a person's health history and use of medical services.
The confidentiality problems for self-insured companies generally are
even worse than for companies with outside insurance coverage. Selfinsured employers have a strong incentive to reduce their own financial
risk by identifying high-risk employees. These companies and others
concerned with health costs choose to screen as a solution. Employers
conclude that they have to spend more to do better screening of their
8 See H. Ostrer et al., Insurance and Genetic Testing: Where Are We Now? 52
Am. J. Hum. Genetics 565 (1993). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381) exempts self-insured employers from state
regulations and laws (such as those regarding minimum required benefits and antidiscrimination provisions) covering health benefits plans, pension plans, and other
benefits that employers provide. Under ERISA, self-insured employers may eliminate
or modify their medical benefits for particular medical conditions.
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workers to remove the expensive people from their rolls or make them
pay a higher share of the cost. One physician who has provided medical
services to many companies says:
I've never seen a company that went self-insured that didn't
seriously compromise whatever little bit of corporate
confidentiality of medical records existed. They become
intensely interested in medical records. It is in corporations'
self-interest to screen workers out, not to take measures to
reduce exposure hazards, and to violate confidentiality of
employee medical records. You could argue that if they
don't, they won't be here.
The burden on small employers of having employees with high
medical costs can be especially heavy. While a large company can
support high-risk employees, an employer with 20 employees is less able
to sustain several employees with large health costs. However, the small
company is less likely to screen to find out what the employees' risk is.
Even when companies are not self-insured, health screening
information makes \ts way to managers. Employees go to their private
physicians and file a 4laim form, which is administered by an insurance
company. The insurer then reports to the employer on the workers'
medical treatment. Periodically, the insurer sends to the benefits or
human resources manager a report delineating the people whose claims
they paid. The human resources director then knows who was treated
for venereal diseases, psychiatric problems or heart disease. Why should
personnel managers have this information?
Social Stratification and Genetic Information
An important social issue regarding applications of genetic
information concerns job discrimination and exclusionary policies based
on genetic information at the point of hiring and beyond. One way of
screening workers has been through testing job applicants or new
employees for genetic traits. The placement of employees stemming
from the application of medical information can be discriminatory.
Medical discrimination remains a very real and significant problem,
despite new laws and political developments.
Diseases with a genetic component are not esoteric. For example,
colorblindness and diabetes have a genetic component, and employers
7 Risk Health, Safety & Environment 201 [Summer 1996]

have screened for these conditions for years. In addition, heart disease
and breast cancer, along with many other diseases, are in part
9
genetic.
Insurance companies and employers claim to identify individuals
who may be genetically susceptible, based on their biology. A major
social problem with genetic information concerns social stratification,
because the layering of our society by race and ethnicity, gender, and
social class affects the use of genetic information. Important
stratification issues often have been involved in workplace medical
screening.
Many genetic abnormalities are disproportionately found among
specific ethnic or racial groups. For example, G-6-PD deficiency and
sickle cell trait are found in high proportions among blacks, so screening
out people with those traits will mean screening blacks out
disproportionately. Some of the new discoveries of genetic
predisposition are likely to be found disproportionately in certain racial
or ethnic groups, or more among women or men, as with genetic
characteristics that are already known. These groups then may
10
experience discriminatory practices by employers and insurers.
Employers and insurance companies are likely to use genetic
information to exclude people from relatively high-paying jobs. They
seldom screen people out of low-paying hazardous jobs. The individuals
screened out are more likely to be blacks or women, who have entered
those jobs in large numbers only in recent years and bear the burden of
genetic information about risk.
As genetic information accumulates through the Human Genome
Project, more people will find it virtually impossible to obtain health
insurance or be stigmatized as a bad risk for employment. People
perceived as having a medical "disorder" can also be stigmatized in
their personal lives. Being so labelled can make it difficult for them to
be perceived

-

or to perceive themselves

-

as normal again. 1 1

9 See Assessing GeneticRisks: Implications for Health and Social Policy (Lori B.
Andrews et al., eds. 1993) and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Genetic Monitoring and Screening in the Workplace (1990).
10 See Geller et al., supra note 3; Philip Reilly, ASHG Statement On Genetics
And Privacy: Testimony to United States Congress, 50 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 640
(1992); Troy Duster, Back Door to Eugenics (1990); Kevles & Hood, supra note 1

and Draper, supra note 5.

11 See Larry 0. Gostin, Genetic Privacy, 23 J. Law, Med. & Ethics 320 (1995);
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Genetic information about individuals can affect their family members'
access to insurance as well. Furthermore, when new genetic information
makes individuals appear to be high-risk, those individuals are likely to
experience as a personal medical problem what is in fact a social
problem that reflects stratification in the broader society.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) went into effect in
1991, and it prohibits pre-employment medical examinations and
discrimination against the disabled. 12 The ADA limits employers'
ability to restrict people -

such as diabetics on insulin

-

from certain

activities. Limitations are to be tailored to the individual rather than
blanket limitations. So we might ask, if employers cannot test people
prior to offering them employment, does that not eliminate the
problem of job discrimination? The basic answer is no, job
discrimination linked to genetics remains an important problem.
The ADA itself does not even mention genetics or genetic traits,
and genetic susceptibility to disease and death was not a focus of the
congressional debate on the ADA. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) originally took the position
essentially that individuals are not covered by the ADA until they are
symptomatic. The EEOC maintained that the risk of impairment in
the future was not considered a disability under the ADA. Then in its
March 1995 interpretation of the ADA, the EEOC stated that
disability under the ADA would include individuals who are
predisposed to, or presymptomatic for, a disabling disease. 13 Under
Bernadine Healy, Testimony on the Pdssible Uses and Misuses of Genetic

Information, 3 Hum. Gene Ther. 51 (1992); Neil A Holtzman & Mark A.
Rothstein, Eugenics and Genetic Discrimination:Invited Editorial,50 Am. J. Hum.
Genetics 457 (1992); Billings et al., supra note 6; and Dan W. Brock, The Human
Genome Project and Human Identity, 29 Houston L.Rev. 7 (1992).
12 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1990). The ADA protects people who have, or who are perceived to have, physical or
mental impairments from employment discrimination, as well as from discrimination
in public accommodations and transportation and in telecommunications. The ADA
explicitly states (in Title V) that prohibited discrimination does not include

conventional risk underwriting by insurance companies or self-insured employers,
instead leaving insurance regulation to the states. See Rothstein, supra note 3. The
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982) declared that states
regulate insurance unless specific federal action seeks to regulate the industry.
13 For discussion of the 1995 EEOC interpretation of the ADA regarding genetic
disabilities, see M. S. Mehlman et al., The Need for Anonymous Genetic
Counseling and Testing, 58 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 393 (1996).
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the ADA, employers are allowed to collect genetic information and
conduct medical examinations in order to reveal the applicant's ability
to perform the job, and employment exams are permitted after a
conditional employment offer is made, when all employees in a
particular job category receive the test. But issues of whether
impairments impede the ability to do the job, and the business
necessity of excluding a person, leave a great deal of room for
judgments that are far from straightforward. It becomes a question of
judgment of how much effort is reasonable to put forth on job
placement and what reasonable accommodation and work assignments
are for someone with potential health problems. The employer is not
supposed to screen out disabled individuals unless it is for a job-related
disability that cannot be accommodated. However, the EEOC
interpretation of the ADA did not limit the employer's ability to
conduct any genetic testing or collect any genetic information after a
conditional job offer, even if the information is not job related.
After employers make job applicants a conditional offer of
employment, employers can give any tests they want. Even if the
employers do not use that information as a reason to exclude people
outright, they can in effect use genetic information to exclude people.
Employers can modify their health insurance coverage to exclude those
people. Workers with signs of damage may be excluded from medical
coverage or charged extremely high rates as a way of reducing
employers' costs - even if the high-risk workers are not fired.
Employers can say to employees: As of today, people like you are not
covered by our health insurance.
In one case, a man who found out he had AIDS made claims and
collected payments from his employer's commercial insurer. Within a
year, the company became self-insured, offering essentially the same
benefits but decreasing lifetime benefits for AIDS from one million to
five thousand dollars. His partner sued after the employee died but lost
initially 14 and again on appeal. 15 According to this case, self-insured
companies can, post-facto, change their benefit plans because of
somebody's claim or because of a genetic test.
14 McGann v. H & H Music, 742 F.Supp. 392 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
15 McGann v. H & H Music, 946 F. 2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. den., Greenberg
v. H & H Music Company, 506 U.S. 981 (1992). See Ostrer et al., supra note 8.
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Through sophisticated screening, employers can continue to offer a
major medical policy without being burdened by individuals with an
adverse genetic profile. Then everyone with a high-risk profile can be
charged a higher deductible or employers can do as insurance
companies do: Tell people they are not insurable. 16 So despite the
ADA and other developments, genetic discrimination remains a very
real problem, and is likely -to become even more significant as the
Human Genome Project uncovers more and more genetic information.
One approach. employers continue to pursue is to inform workers
that they face special genetic risks on the job, then allow them to choose
to endanger themselves or their children. Yet, the extent to which
screening tests and questionnaires calling for medical information are
voluntary is questionable. The rhetoric of choice is indeed tricky. It is
not merely an individual and welcome choice when workers are told
they may be at special risk genetically and they have a "choice" to stay
on or quit their job. To what extent should people be allowed to
endanger themselves or their children for wages? And are people really
making an "individual" choice if they take a dangerous job?
Individuals with few job alternatives have limited choices when
offered "voluntary" testing or opportunities to divulge health
information. Issues of choice and coercion arise when individuals are

pressured to provide medical information, when they are threatened
with losing their employment or insurance, and when they find that the
17
counseling recommended for private patients is unavailable to them.

Employers overlook the restrictive conditions under which choices
about health and employment take place. The economic necessity of
working, limited job alternatives, managerial control and incomplete

employee information on hazards all serve to limit the available choices.

16 Hundreds of health insurers in the U.S. share their computerized data on healthcare costs and risks. See Dorothy Nelkin & Laurence Tancredi, Dangerous
Diagnostics: The Social Power of Biological Information (1989); and NIH-DOE,
supra note 3.
17 See Mehlman et al., supra note 13; Arthur Caplan, Moral Matters: Ethical Issues
in Medicine and the Life Sciences (1995); American Medical Association, Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Use of Genetic Testing by Employers, 266 JAMA 1827
(1991); Alexander Morgan Capron, Hedging Their Bets, Hastings Center Report,
May-June, 1993, at 30; and Kevles & Hood, supra note 1.
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Screening Overshadows Monitoring _
Screening and monitoring are two major alternatives that have
developed in response to the identification of genetic and biological
traits and hazardous substances. Screening has developed as an
alternative to monitoring, in that high-risk individuals have been
identified and screened out as a favored means of reducing exposure to
environmental contaminants. Employers increasingly favor a screening
approach to environmental hazards. In fact, the screening approach is
winning, which leads to some significant problems. The screening
approach involves detecting individuals who then will be excluded from
exposure to the toxic substance. In contrast, the declining monitoring
approach involves monitoring contaminants in order to determine
whether exposures are too high for those who are exposed to them like measuring levels of air contaminants with a radiation badge.
With rising health costs and threatening liability trends, employers
increasingly turn to health screening policies that focus on individuals
who may pose a special risk in the workplace. The prospects of greater
insurance and Workers' Compensation expenses, along with
discrimination suits, make identifying those with threatening personal
habits or medical conditions an especially promising strategy for
companies to deal with medical and economic problems. Employers
have been concerned about the catastrophic potential of allowing
workers with a drug abuse problem, specific genetic traits or the AIDS
virus to remain on the job. They have screened workers based on health
risks related to smoking, reproductive hazards, drug use, genes or
biological traits.
Many employers and company physicians are now strongly drawn
to medical screening as a way of avoiding hiring or retaining workers
who may pose the greatest threat to the financial health of their
companies. Employers and their insurers may obtain medical
information in a variety of ways: from tests, questionnaires, reports of
coworkers or insurance records. In other words, workplace medical
screening does not require that employers actually conduct their own
testing programs. They may nonetheless use this screening information
to determine the employability, job placement, insurability or general
treatment of workerg.
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Employers who favor a screening approach often see those who
oppose it as technophobic and anti-scientific. But this perspective is
invalid, because opponents of screening do not oppose science and
technology generally: they typically favor other advanced technologies
and scientific developments.
An example of the screening and monitoring approaches is the
contrast between types of genetic testing, with monitoring seeking to
uncover genetic damage from pollutants and genetic screening, in
which individuals are screened - usually once - to see whether they
have a genetic susceptibility to disease. The approach of screening highrisk individuals is likely to become even more pervasive as the Human
Genome Project uncovers more genetic information.
Employers' focus on individual hazards rather than the environment
is intensifying, which shifts the attention and blame from corporate
technological risks to individual predispositions. People's position in the
labor force has a strong effect on how people perceive the possible
benefits and dangers of genetic information. Employers are much more
likely than workers to believe that people should be excluded from jobs
because of genetic information. Corporate managers tend to support
collecting genetic information that would enable them to identify and
possibly weed out genetically high-risk individuals. In contrast, workers
and union representatives tend to favor ongoing genetic monitoring,
which involves periodically testing groups of people to see if there is
18
genetic damage over time from exposure to toxic substances.
Monitoring information generally is used as evidence of chemical
damage to groups of workers, rather than to exclude people and lay the
blame for their disease on individuals' genetic makeup. Monitoring
tends to lead to reducing exposure levels rather than removing
individuals from the environment.
Diseases are called "genetic" and screened for as inborn biological
traits despite evidence of the importance of environmental factors.
Spina bifida is generally described as "genetic," although it is prevalent
in highly polluted industrial areas, such as South Wales. 1 9 Another
example of the ascendant screening perspective concerns sickle cell trait,
18 See American Medical Association, supra; Draper, supra note 5; and Willian
Ryan, Blaming the Victini (1971).
19 See Duster, supra note 10.
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which is widely described as "genetic" even though it protects
individuals from the environmental threat of malaria. Similarly, PKU is
called "genetic," despite the fact that it can be prevented effectively
20
through diet.
A major problem with genetic screening is that it has been
ineffective preventive mediciine. The best the tests can do is show that
certain individuals may be somewhat at greater risk for one type of
ailment when exposed to one substance or group of chemicals. But they
may be less at risk for another. They might be at lower risk of
developing emphysema, but they may develop bladder cancer from the
same substance or from other chemicals. Current screening tests suffer
from both narrow applicability and limited predictiveness. Genetic
screening may penalize far more people than it protects, and in some
cases may not protect workers at all. Further, it can give employers and
workers who remain a false sense of security, by making them think
21
that screening out workers has eliminated the health risk.
Another example of a problematic screening approach concerns the
risks of cotton dust, which is regulated as a hazardous substance.
Company officials have stated that only a small proportion of the work
force is vulnerable to cotton dust and should therefore be screened out
of jobs with exposure to it. This claim that almost all workers are safe
when exposed to cotton dust, and that therefore no real need to
monitor the substance exists, contributes to companies' interest in
screening out certain workers as high risk. A similar example of the
declining monitoring approach from outside the workplace is the
arguments against monitoring and regulating potential carcinogens in
the diet, which have been used as political arguments to justify
22
potentially harmful exposures.
20 See Andrews, supra note 9; Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 9; and
Duster, supra note 10.
21 See Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 9 and Draper, supra note 5.
22 See Organizations, Uncertainties, and Risk (James F. Short & Lee Clarke, eds.
1992); Sylvia Noble Tesh, Hidden Arguments: Political Ideology and Disease
Prevention Policy (1988); and Draper, supra note 5. Arguments against the 1958
Delaney Clause of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act have maintained that since
such small quantities of material can now be detected, prohibiting detectable
carcinogens in food is no longer necessary.
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When individuals become sick, proponents of screening generally
assume those people must share characteristics beyond the workplace
exposure. In their conviction that only certain types of workers will have
a problem, they maintain that the others are safe. So when employers
say the existence of a genetic factor means that only 2% of the work
force are in danger, that is another way of saying 98% are safe. Saying
that a group is at risk is another way of saying that the work force is safe
once that group is removed. Furthermore, people who believe current
levels of contaminants are harmless and overregulated are more likely to
believe that people who get sick must have something wrong with them,
so we should try to identify them and screen them out.
The important underlying question here is: Do we focus on the
individual or on the environment? In fact, a certain percentage of people
may develop these diseases and others may not, but in most cases the
idea that a biological trait of the workers themselves causes the problem
is unproven. Focusing on the individuals and their possible
predispositions too often is a way of inappropriately changing the
subject, away from the workplace hazards.
Despite legal developments such as the ADA and Johnson
Controls2 3 barring fetal exclusion policies, employers still focus on
the individual health risks of high-risk individuals. The public health
orientation toward eliminating environmental hazards such as asbestos
has given way to a preoccupation with individual health risks and a
search for workers with an inappropriate lifestyle such as drug use or
individual genetic predisposition. Two major examples of the screening
approach serve as models to avoid for the application of genetic
information: drug screening and fetal exclusion policies used for
reproductive hazards screening.
Drug Screening As a Model to Avoid
Drug use and wellness programs are part of the search for workers
with individual health risks. Drug testing is widespread in the
workplace.2 4 The large companies in which I interviewed doctors
23 International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
24 See Under the Influence? Drugs and the American Work Force (Jacques
Normand, Richard 0. "Lempert & Charles P. O'Brien, eds.1994); Nancy Durbin &
Tom Grant, Fitness for Duty in the Nuclear Industry. Update of the Technical Issues
1996 (Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers); and Drug Testing in the Workplace
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about occupational medicine, for example, test all job applicants for all
positions and all new employees who are provisionally offered a job.
They also periodically test workers in safety-sensitive jobs and in jobs in
which the U.S. Department of Transportation or Nuclear Regulatory
Commission require random testing, and test people "for cause"

-

after an accident or serious incident or functional deficit that creates the
suspicion that drugs are involved. 2 5 When we consider potential
applications of genetic information, this model of drug testing is a
major one to avoid.
Employers use tests that they acknowledge to be ineffective in
detecting many problems. Drug screening results in few positive test
results, but employers argue that it deters drug users from applying to
work for them and keeps some casual drug-user employees away from
drugs. 2 6 Then it becomes the lemming effect: One company does it
and the other companies line up to do preplacement testing. Employers
fear that if they were not to test, drug users would gravitate to them.
Some companies report that in certain locations they initially had
20-50% positive test results identifying drug users. Now corporations
that carry out drug testing find a very low fraction of positives. A
typical positive rate in corporations that routinely test applicants for
employment and use for-cause testing is closer now to 1-4%.27
People who conduct drug testing in companies say that although
the policing function is not particularly effective in catching drug users,
they avoid workers who take drugs when they announce at the
beginning that they occasionally will do random drug testing. It is not
even the fact of their drug testing that has an effect, then; it is just the
specter of their doing it. Their implicit belief is that the accuracy of the
(Scott McDonald & Paul Roman, eds. 1994).
25 Examples of jobs subject to random drug testing are trucker and power plant

operator. Employers in transportation do extensive random drug testing. Workers
covered by U.S. Department of Transportation rules established in 1988 typically
undergo a standard, routine, formalized random drug test; generally random
numbers and names are generated by computer.
26 See Normand et al., supra note 24 and MacDonald & Roman, supra note 24.
27 See American Management Association, 1994 AMA Survey- Workplace Drug
Testing and Drug Abuse Policies and Durbin & Grant, supra note 2T
The former reported that in 1993, among the 794 companies responding to their
questionnaire (48.1% of whom are in manufacturing and 87.2% of whom test for
employee drug use), 2.5% of the over 96,000 drug tests of employees in 1993 and
4.3% of the over 97,000 drug tests of new hires in 1993 were positive.
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drug testing is less important than having drug users believe it is
accurate and go to another company. They say they rarely do random
tests or routine spot checks on employees except in certain power plants
and sensitive positions. But they make the threat of drug tests clear by
displaying posters and telling the employees often that drug testing
could be done, in an attempt to frighten drug users away. One
chemical company physician says:
The reason we do drug testing on all new hires is not that
it's good procedure. It is that it keeps us from getting a
disproportionate share of junkies.
A doctor employed by a major bank who reports that the company
had a rate of positive urine drug test results of 1.4% the previous year
says he recommended that management stop drug testing.
At one point I said to them, "Just tell them we tested them.
We'll just pour it down the drain." It just didn't seem
worthwhile to me to find that small percentage.
An unfortunate parallel with genetic information is that employers,
insurers and even scientists at times have advocated that ineffective
screening policies be used in the workplace, in the belief that screening
would accomplish goals that are only sometimes health-related.
Another parallel with genetic information is that drug testing
generally does not detect impairment at work. It detects whether a
substance is in the body, but not whether the substance causes any
28
impairment whatsoever on the job.
If company policies were consistent, they would apply to alcohol
and prescription drug use. They would discourage people from abusing
any substance that has an adverse impact, including alcohol. However,
employers have not been nearly as concerned with prescription
medication as with illegal drugs. They also have not focused on fatigue
as a major cause of accidents. In general, managers avoid looking at the
workplace as a cause of drug and alcohol abuse or other personnel
problems. 2 9 A parallel concern with genetic information is that
28 See Durbin & Grant, supra note 24 and Robert McCunney, Drug Testing:
Technical Complications of a Complex Social Issue, 15 Am. J. Ind. Med. 589
(1989).
29 Durbin & Grant, supra note 24, conclude, Ch.3, at 23, from their review of the

technical findings and survey data on drug and alcohol use:

Despite the popular attention paid to illegal drugs, alcohol clearly
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employers' focus on identifying uncommon biological traits
overshadows the prevention of more pervasive health risks.
For-cause and random drug testing have been voluntary in name
only, as with screening for biological traits. Discussion of informed
consent and voluntary testing with both genetic and drug testing has
tended to mask the coercive context of workplace screening. One
physician hired by a metals company to do their testing explains:
We had for-cause alcohol and drug testing for people who
management suspected were under the influence. We didn't
have mandatory testing. Well, it was called voluntary, but it
was really mandatory: You didn't have to take the test; but
you'd get fired if you didn't. (Laughter).
As with genetic information, drug testing information passes
directly to management and can be used to affect employment. With
such testing, the notion of a confidential doctor-patient relationship
becomes even more tenuous. The physicians' priority of delivering
health care is in tension with the screening concerns that corporate
officials who do not provide health care have regarding workplace
safety, the ability of workers to do their jobs and employer costs. The
focus of employer screening instead should be on whether the person
has a health condition that may be made worse by work, places others
at risk or prevents them from doing the job.
Reproductive Hazards Policies for Targeting High-Risk Individuals
In addition to drug testing, reproductive hazards policies for
targeting high-risk individuals are a model to consider in analyzing
issues of choice, privacy and information control in the applications of
genetic innovation. The fetal exclusion policies many companies have
followed are an important example of the screening approach and one
that is genetically based. These policies, in which women have been
barred from particular jobs because of possible fetal damage, were most
pervasive in companies in the 1980's through the early 1990's.
Employers have argued that excluding women from lead and other
toxics protects the fetus from harm and protects women from
remains the most commonly used, and abused, mind-altering drug in
America. This is true for both the general population and employed
workers. Survey findings show that while illegal drug use has declined
among the general population over the past decade, heavy alcohol use
has remaine§ stable.
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reproductive damage. For example, beginning in 1978 American
Cyanamid barred women of childbearing capacity from production
jobs involving lead. Five women underwent sterilization procedures as a
result of this exclusionary policy.
Fetal exclusion policies have been selectively applied. Most of the
jobs barred to women have been relatively high-paying and traditionally
male production jobs in large companies, such as General Motors and
DuPont. In general, the issue of special risk and exclusion has emerged
only when women are relatively new to an occupation and a minority,
as women are to the chemical industry and lead battery plants.
Women's presence and different health becomes an issue when they
move into jobs they had not held previously. The question of exclusion
has not come up in jobs where women are a majority, such as in lowpaying electronics jobs with exposure to powerful solvents or hospital
30
jobs with exposure to ionizing radiation.
As with genetic screening, although a particular group may be high
risk because of their biology, many others may be at risk. It may be true
that some workers are somewhat more likely than others to develop
disease. But policies of banning women from jobs fail to protect
workers and the unborn from job-related harm, in part because they
leave remaining workers exposed to substances that can cause sperm
damage and other reproductive effects, along with genetic damage and
cancer. For example, lead can cause birth defects through maternal
exposure, but the men who remained were vulnerable as well, because
lead can also damage the heart, kidneys and nervous system in both
men and women. In some cases, risks through fathers' exposure to
hazards may even be greater than the maternal reproductive risks. For
instance, male exposure to ionizing radiation presents a higher risk for
genetic mutations and chromosome aberrations than reproductive risk
through female workers.
In the widely publicized Johnson Controls case, the Supreme
Court ruled that the corporation's policy of barring fertile women from
relatively high-paying jobs with exposure to lead unjustifiably
discriminated against women. 3 1 But physicians and others in
30 See Elaine Draper, Fetal Exclusion Policies and Gendered Constructions of
Suitable Work 40 Social Problems 90 (1993) for discussion of the selective

application of fetal exclusion policies.
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corporations whom I have interviewed since Johnson Controls indicate
that some employers have not cancelled or revised their policies of
barring workers they consider high-risk - even in the face of
discrimination suits, because they fear costly third-party suits on behalf
of fetuses affected by work exposures. Some companies simply ignore
reproductive hazards; others handle reproductive issues on a one-onone, ad hoc basis, with no policy developed.
A parallel with genetic innovation is that purported discovery of a
high-risk group diverts attention from the remaining individuals.
Corporate employers resist broadening their understanding of
reproductive hazards beyond women and are reluctant to focus on men,
even though little evidence shows risks confined to direct exposure of
the fetus. Research now sometimes involves male reproductive
toxicology, so employers are more aware of reproductive hazards to
men than before Johnson Controls,3 2 although the scientific and
policy aspects of reproductive hazards continue to be mired in
complexity. Nevertheless, employers still focus on risks to women in
part because male reproductive hazards are relatively unfamiliar to them
and because women and motherhood fit together ideologically in a way
that makes the evidence for excluding women more compelling than it
might be if they examined these assumptions critically. Employers
suspect if they focused on male reproductive hazards they might have
to exclude men from jobs. In addition, they know that broadening
their concern about reproductive hazards beyond women might lead to
further pressure to clean up the workplace if both women and men were
known to be at risk.
As with genetic information, choice rhetoric concerning
reproductive hazards gets used in powerful ways to legitimate otherwise
less palatable policies. Both before and after the 1991 Johnson
Controls decision, employers have used the rhetoric of choice to
legitimate their policies. The debate over reproductive hazards in
corporations is a telling case of language constructions people use to
33
justify what is in their interests.
31 499 U.S. 187.
32 Id.

33 The pro-choice arguments appear in hearings on fetal exclusion policies, and in
the thousands of pages of briefs and transcripts related to the Johnson Controls cases
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Employers have argued that they must have the choice of how best
to protect people's reproductive health and therefore they must be
allowed to protect the fetus from hazardous mothers and protect
women from their own bad decisions. Employers recognize the power
of pro-choice rhetoric and use it themselves. For example, Johnson
Controls' chief counsel, Stanley Jaspan, asserted that an employer must
not be "required to expose the individual, to expose the child." 34 He
said some women had acted irresponsibly in ways that could endanger
a fetus when the company tried a voluntary approach allowing pregnant
workers to change jobs. He argued that employers rather than women
workers ought to be able to choose what is safe or hazardous for the
fetus. 3 5 This corporate perspective on reproductive risk draws on the
decision-making models favored by free-market economists and
rational choice theorists, who maintain that individuals are fairly
compensated for dangerous work and freely choose it.
Significantly, employers' individual-decision-making stance
regarding hazards at work closely resembles pro-choice arguments that
equal rights advocates use against fetal exclusion policies. Opponents of
corporate fetal exclusion policies typically argue that women should be
given health information and be able to choose for themselves with
minimal interference from outside forces whether to take the risk of
possible fetal harm rather than be excluded from jobs. Thus, both
employers and critics of their policies share certain misconceptions
about the social context of risk, by overestimating the extent to which
individuals can freely choose risk in the hazardous workplace.
Although the Supreme Court decided in 1991 that employers
cannot choose to exclude women, 3 6 choice rhetoric remains very
strong. Some large employers essentially require women to sign waivers
saying the women choose to risk their reproductive health and will not
hold the company liable if they want to stay in jobs that may be
hazardous to fetuses. Women may be denied jobs if they refuse to sign
away their rights. Employers switched to using waivers soon after the
Supreme Court decision, in the belief that continuing their fetal
in California, Illinois, and the Supreme Court (1990).
34 499 U.S. 187 (transcript, at 36).
35 See Normand et al:, supra note 24.
36 499 U.S. 187.
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exclusion policies would leave them too vulnerable to a lawsuit for
discrimination against women. Employers maintain that they are giving
women the choice by having them sign waivers and that women
themselves assume the risks, similar to the notion of "informed
consent." A physician who works for an aerospace company says:
We ask the person to sign a waiver to indicate that they
prefer to stay on the job even though they recognize a
hazard to the fetus.
More bluntly, a chemical industry physician who supports having
women sign waivers if they remain in jobs with toxic exposures and
whose company uses waivers for reproductive hazards says:
I'm a great believer in freedom of choice, so I think people
should be permitted to kill themselves.
Generally it is not permissible to exclude women from lead or other
hazards because of possible fetal hazards. But signing away a thirdparty's rights

-

or the incipient or potential rights -

of the fetus is

also impermissible. Many people are willing to sign a statement saying
they knowingly take a risk in order to keep their job and agree not to
hold the employer responsible. But getting permission from the parent
does not adequately protect the company in terms of the unborn child
or shield the company from liability because the employer does not
have permission from the unborn child to expose them. In addition,
parents cannot sign away their Workers' Compensation rights granted
by state law, so a company is responsible at least for Workers'
Compensation. Workers can sign an informed consent saying they
realize they have a higher risk of getting carpal tunnel syndrome or
another cumulative trauma disorder because they pack a million
widgets in boxes every day. But as soon as they get carpal tunnel
syndrome, the employer still would be expected to pay part of the bill
for that occupational injury under Workers' Compensation, whether or
not the person knew about the risk.
Liability issues regarding reproductive hazards are a major concern
for employers. One reason they are so concerned is that even just with
the background rate of birth defects of 2-7%, employers anticipate
that they are likely to have female employees who have birth defects.
Inevitably there will be some miscarriages and defects, leading to
lawsuits on behalf of a damaged child. The medical evidence that very
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low exposure levels are hazardous to fetuses is complex but is
accumulating. By using waivers to respond to reproductive hazards,
employers continue to leave themselves vulnerable to lawsuits for fetal
damage and cause others to risk reproductive damage.
In addition to attempts to transfer responsibility for hazards onto
workers' own choices such as through waivers, many companies try to
shift the responsibility for hazards to private doctors outside the
company. Employers send women to their personal doctors for their
judgment about risk and ask them to sign a statement certifying that
the working conditions are safe for the fetus, saying: "I guarantee
conditions would be safe for her to continue working" or "I approve
having this woman remain at work." This happens in a wide range of
companies, including the semiconductor, defense, printing, airline and
chemical companies, which represents another defense mechanism
through which employers attempt to shift liability. By using waivers
from private physicians, employers believe the outside doctor may then
be held liable for any reproductive damage or for encouraging women
to continue working if damage results. 37 A physician employed by a
major airline says:
In the medical department we provide a rather elaborate job
description of work site exposures for a pregnant woman.
She then takes this to her obstetrician; who looks at it. That
job description describes what they do physically, whether
the job involves heavy lifting and pushing or changes in
temperature, environment, barometric-pressure, biorhythm
or time-zone. Then he will sign yea or nay that this person
can work for the next thirty days. The private physician may
be reluctant to sign, but nevertheless, we insist that the
employee get that document. We will not put the employee
back into their work environment without it.
If private doctors say that pregnant or fertile women cannot work,
the women may be fired. Also, some private physicians are unwilling to
sign the letters and are reluctant to take on that potential liability of
saying the person is safe, because they might be accountable if problems
arise. Women then are excluded from jobs if their private doctor will
not sign such a letter, even where the job does not present health
37 However, if the treating physician says the job is safe, the employer rather than
the outside physician iight still be ultimately liable.
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problems. The company policy leads some women to believe that they
are excluded because their doctor will not cooperate.
Getting private doctors to permit exposures is similar to many
companies' perspective on genetic information, in that in both cases,
responsibility for adverse outcomes would rest with someone other than
the employer. Doctors and employers are very likely to use waivers with
individuals considered genetically high-risk, then give people the choice
of taking on hazardous work, as in the case of fetal exclusion, or require
that private doctors sign agreements permitting environmental
exposures. We can expect this pattern to become more pervasive with
advancing genetic innovation.
Genome Innovation Reconsidered: Conclusions
As genetic innovation advances, the perception of a genetic defect
will become broader, so that people being perceived as genetically
flawed will be an increasingly prevalent problem. The expanding
genetic innovation from the Human Genome Project increasingly will
identify individuals as high-risk for a widening array of diseases. Several
points and arenas of change need greater attention in examining health
and employment practices related to genetics and in considering
alternative policies. These concern access to health care, equitable
applications of genetic technologies and the use of genetic information.
Universal health coverage and a single-payer health care system
could mean that individuals and groups considered high-risk would no
longer be denied health coverage or medical care. Universal access is a
crucial concern in addressing problems of privacy, discrimination and
availability of affordable health care. A single payer system of
government-financed health care for those who require it could help
ensure that people who need the insurance and health care are able to
get it. Moreover, screening would have fewer adverse effects on those
considered high-risk, because they would have less to fear about losing
access to medical treatment.
The exclusion of people with a genetic defect from private insurance
is a major issue, though some insurance companies, such as Blue Cross,
voluntarily stopped excluding people with pre-existing conditions from
eligibility for insurance coverage. Since most insurance is bought in
groups, people obtain insurance virtually automatically with their
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employment, so that they are not excluded for preexisting conditions.
However, insurance companies are resourceful in coming up with ways
to exclude people when they think those people will cost them money.
An important and generally overlooked concern is employers who
are self insured and who exclude people. Self-insured companies
remove themselves from the state system regulating health care, so the
restrictions on their actions are few. An example is the McGann case in
Texas mentioned earlier. This loophole for self-insured companies
should be closed, so that individuals who are among the most in need
of health insurance will not be denied it.
Employers must ensure that employees know what the problems
and recognized consequences are and know how to protect themselves.
Also, individuals identified as high-risk for disease need more than
simply information. Companies should not exclude as a way of
protection and should do much more affirmatively to deal with hazards
and reduce exposures. Anti-discrimination laws should extend to
genetic predisposition. The ADA now covers individuals perceived to
be susceptible to illness, not just those who are symptomatic, according
to the EEOC guidelines. However, case law has yet to determine
whether and under what circumstances an employer must
accommodate someone who may be at special risk in the workplace.
Government regulations could follow the lead of the OSHA lead
standard, which provides that if individuals are at special risk, they
could be transferred temporarily to other jobs but retain their wages
and seniority. Companies could offer individuals at risk an opportunity
to move to another, equal-status job in another area without any loss of
pay. However, it becomes difficult to transfer workers to another
position when the company is small or in a layoff or downsizing mode.
Not only are genetic screening issues of concern, but also problems
of genetic information are becoming increasingly important. Doctors
increasingly will market genetic tests directly to patients, so potentially
individuals could be tested and keep information about their genetic
makeup to themselves. But too often, genetic test results should be
considered confidential when in fact they are not. Since employers and
agencies can ask people on questionnaires about their genes, having tests
privatized - that is, performed by one's private physician - does not
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solve the privacy problems by any means. Moreover, genetic
information is entered into data banks when individuals apply for
reimbursement from third parties.
State laws vary in terms of access to medical records. The
confidentiality of medical records is important, but one problem with
medical records

-

whether or not they are company records

-

is that

people who do not get to see them are not in a position to know
whether or not something is wrong in the record. If people were to
obtain their medical records, they could help ensure that nothing
inaccurate is in them. Misrepresentations of information can have
devastating consequences in terms of employment, insurance and
stigmatization, especially as companies increasingly do computer
searches of employees and job applicants.
The approach of screening people out should not gain support
without carefully looking at evidence that only certain individuals are at
risk. Our ability to produce new technologies and introduce new toxic
substances has exceeded our ability to envision potential consequences.
Without good epidemiological evidence, it is difficult to be sure a
substance is safe at low exposure levels. The reality of the workplace and
environment is that people are exposed to combinations of hazardous
substances, and most new chemicals undergo little or no testing.
Employers inappropriately have tended to make claims to truth
about genetically high-risk individuals and safe substances without
having the burden of proof. They tend to give the benefit of the doubt
to the chemicals rather than to the health of workers and the public.
Companies that manufacture or work with toxic substances say small
quantities of substances are not of concern. They tend to hold the
outside environment or people's lifestyle responsible for worker disease.
Science involves many unknowns, of course, but in an environment of
uncertainty, surely employers should not have the final say as to what is
safe. When employers claim that substances are safe, that genetic
information should be used to differentiate among risks and that
individuals' diseases are produced by genetic predispositions rather than
products or workplaces, they should have the burden of proof.
We have the powerful precedent of the tobacco industry saying
there is no proof that smoking causes cancer and the long-standing
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argument that low-level nuclear radiation is safe. Now, when companies
say substances are safe so that only a few high-risk individuals are
genetically at risk, we must keep these precedents in mind.
Arguments that workplace hazards are inconsequential have the
effect of getting companies off the hook. Company officials and their
lawyers have firmly established their arguments about how the
substances they use or produce are safe. But in the interest of being
objective and scientific, it is important to become aware of the
connections between science and society, and how these claims to safety
and truth have been used.
When employers say a job is dangerous or safe, or that certain
individuals are high-risk, it is hard for individuals to judge the merits of
the employers' case. Workers need trustworthy information about risks
to individuals as well as aggregate data that may reveal patterns of
hazards, health risks and groups screened out. For that, effective
regulatory power is important, and alert labor organizations can serve a
critical function in protecting health. However, federal OSHA and state
occupational health programs have cut back enforcement of health
protections. In addition, although some unions have addressed genetic
information and medical risk, overall they represent a small percentage
of the work force and restrictive labor laws have curtailed their power.
Such losses result in reduced regulatory and labor union oversight of
policies related to genetic and health information.
Having health services with expertise outside companies could offer
health information more independent of the employer. Independently
funded clinics or medical groups could do screening outside of
employer control and with protected medical records. This could go
far to alleviate the problem of companies having access to medical data
about their employees, although the problem of third-party access to
genetic information would remain. The control of the health services
ought to be separated from the workplace and genetic information
should be controlled by individuals as much as possible.
The benefit of doubt must be given to the protection of individuals'
health, not to the safety of chemical substances. Corporate concern with
reproductive risks from hazardous corporate technologies has been
ineffective. Rather than focus on gathering information on possibly
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genetically high-risk groups and presume that conditions are safe once
high-risk individuals are identified and screened out, why not instead
reduce the hazard to the work force and general public? We need to
continue to monitor substances carefully in such a way that all who are
exposed may be- protected - and to continue to collect and analyze
data to determine whether" low-level exposures are indeed safe and to
detect risks to populations. The health risk problem should be refraned
so that it is conceptualized more broadly, to encompass hazards to both
men and women in a wide range of jobs. The fact that hazards have not
been conceptualized in this way has much to do with social
stratification and the corporate context .of power and control in which
work hazards exist.
An important barrier to effective preventive measures is that they
cost money in the short term, and many decision makers lack longrange vision or incentives. Managers are rewarded on the bottom line
this year rather than in ten or twenty years, when they may not be in
the same job or company.
Risks allocation should be proportional to benefits. Science, social
policy, and the law should help insure that companies will bear most of
the financial burden of occupational disease.
In addition, employees generally should not be able to choose lifethreatening jobs or toxic work that would damage themselves or their
children. Risk policies have been laden with strong and perilous rhetoric
of choice. Arguments about hazards in employment have made social
issues and problems appear merely to be matters of personal and
individual choice, which, in fact, they are not. In this sense, then, one
should not be "pro-choice" in the workplace, as much as pro-health and
pro-environment.
Genetic innovation is part of a broad social picture. The applications
of genetic information are shaped by our system of social stratification
through information access rules, through insurance company policies,
and through companies' medical testing and employment policies.
Whether technologies can be patented is a different question from
whether the technologies can or should be used. Technology transfer
can have negative .returns to the society beyond dollars, along with the
beneficial effects. As we become involved in promoting the genetic
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technology, we also need to be aware of its risks and likely effects.
Patents and the patent system are not a good mechanism for
controlling technology. They give a mechanism for recovering R&D
costs, but without addressing social issues.
Due to the power dynamics and economic interests I have
discussed, expanding genetic information presents problems of
inappropriate or harmful access to genetic information by employers,
company physicians, and insurance companies. It also poses problems of
privacy and discrimination and environmental degradation that will not
be solved without adequately addressing the social context of power,
control, and economic interests within which genetic information is
created and put to use.
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